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The California Public Pension Fund (CalPERS) is one of the large pension funds. Over time it has gained 
a reputation for being a prudent stevedore. Embracing an activist shareholder role, CalPERS 
management monitor their investments and on occasion target firms needing improvement. The Focus list 
is a public prodding to take corrective action. This study examines the reaction of the market to the 
CalPERS focus list. Results show a statistically significant negative reaction in the short term. Long term 
portfolio results point to positive returns indicative of improved performance but, these results may be 




The California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) has over $ 200 billion in assets. 
Over the years it has gained an activist reputation. The size of investment provides it with a strong voice 
and the incentive to incur monitoring costs. CalPERS nudges the management and the board to act in the 
best interest of the shareholders. CalPERS regularly examines its portfolio and seeks change in firms that 
can potentially perform better. Some firms heed to this attention while those that ignore the attention end 
up on the focus list.  
This study examines the reaction of the market to the publishing of the CalPERS focus list. On one 
hand, an investor could interpret this news positively: A large shareholder is actively pushing 
management and the board, to improve operations. 
In the remaining sections, the literature is reviewed, we present our results and the paper ends with a 
discussion. 
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 RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Investors seek all types of news to trade on. It has been documented that the market can be slow to 
incorporate new relevant information into prices. For example, Rendleman, Jones, and Latane (1982) 
document stock price drift in the post-earnings-announcement period. Loughran and Ritter (1995) find 
under-reaction to seasoned issues of common stock. 
Markets also can over-react to announcements. DeBondt and Thaler’s (1985) seminal paper argues 
the market over-reacts to large and unexpected announcements as demonstrated by their winners-losers 
effect.  The market’s interpretation of announcements causes excessive prices changes and then there is a 
correction phase over time where the market seems to understand the event. 
Interestingly, in some situations the announcements are neither relevant nor “new.”  For example, 
Urrutia and Vu (1999) examined what happens to firms that show upon the cover of BusinessWeek, they 
document an overreaction. Clayman (1987) looks at firms that invest effort in being rewarded with the 
Baldridge award. She finds no abnormal return when one invests in these firms. Cooper, et. al. (2001) find 
that firms which added “dot com” to their names experienced positive announcement effects during the 
‘Dot Com’ bubble period, while Cooper, et. al. (2005) find firms which removed “dot com” from their 
names experienced positive announcement effects during the ‘Dot Com’ crash period. Evidence of small 
retail investors over-reacting to “cosmetic” announcements is found by Cooper, Gulen, and Rau, (2005). 
They find that mutual funds which change their name to reflect the current “hot” investment style 
experience an abnormal large inflow of money into their funds. Kolodny, Laurence & Ghosh (1989) study 
the ‘excellent firm’ (Peters & Waterman) portfolio; shareholders do not benefit from such a listing. 
Brammer, Brooks & Pavelin (2004) find similar results in Management Today’s list of the United 
Kingdom’s Most Admired Firms.  
While others have examined the CalPERS focus list, these papers typically focus on the impact of 
CalPERS intervention in the long-run firm performance. For example, Junkins & Toth (2009) shows that 
firms on the focus list actually improve and that these firms provide a superior return to the S&P 500 
Index and the Wilshire 4500 index over a five year period. Barber (2007) also examines the focus list. 
Crutchley et. al. (1998) obtain similar results. In this paper, we focus on the short-run announcement 
effect and its statistical significance through the lens of the over-reaction interpretation and how these 
results may be explained in a behavioral framework. 
 
DATA & METHOD 
 
We collect the CalPERS focus list and the publication date from 1996 till 2010 and subject it to 
standard event study methodology using EVENTUS. On each announcement date we form an equally 
weighted portfolio. We then compare the returns of the focus portfolio to the returns of a market portfolio 




Table 1 shows the results of the focus portfolio when compared to the market index without 
adjustment for risk. The Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 is the proxy for the market portfolio. The market 
adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the observed return on the S&P index for the day from the 
return on the stock for the day. 
 
MAR (jt) = R(jt) – R(mt) 
 
Markets react negatively, which indicates that the portfolio loses value for the eleven day and sixty 
one day windows. Interestingly, for the larger window (-30,+250) the returns are positive. While these 
results may be spurious in that over time many other events could affect the share prices; these results are 
also consistent with a negative over-reaction in the short run followed by a correction. Again the market 
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 adjusted returns show that windows (-5,+5) and (-30,+30) indicate that the markets react to the publishing 
of the CalPERS focus list. 
 
TABLE 1 
MARKET ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
Days N Mean Cumulative Abnormal return 
Precision 
Weighted CAAR Positive/Negative 
(+1,+30) 98 1.44% 1.38% 50/48) 
(-5,+5) 98 -1.50% -0.43% 50/48) 
(-1,+1) 98 0.19% 0.56% 51/47) 
(-30,+30) 98 -1.00% -2.26% 52/46> 
(-1,+250) 98 -10.23% -12.73% 47/51 
(-30,+250) 98 -12.83% -16.74% 46/52 
(0,+250) 98 -10.22% -13.01% 46/52 
Symbols ), > show direction and test of significance at 0.10 and 0.05 level. 
 
 
Table 2 presents the market model using the equally weighted index. We show the eleven day 
window (-5,+5) show a negative return for the focus portfolio after adjusting for the returns on the 
market. The larger window (-30,+30) shows a change, the negative returns turn positive. Results using the 
Scholes-Williams model for adjusted betas are similar to the Market Model results. 
 
TABLE 2 
MARKET MODEL USING THE EQUALLY WEIGHTED INDEX 
 
Days N Mean Cumulative Abnormal return 
Precision 
Weighted CAAR 
(+1,+30) 98 5.06% 3.98% 
(-5,+5) 98 -0.41% 0.63% 
(-1,+1) 98 0.60% 0.69% 
(-30,+30) 98 6.82% 4.33% 
Symbols ), >> show direction and test of significance at 0.10 and 0.01 level. 
 
TABLE 3 










Positive/Negative Patell Z p-value 
(+1,+30) 98 4.18% 3.98% 54/44 ) 3.388 0.0004 
(-5,+5) 98 -0.50% 0.63% 51/47 0.878 0.1901 
(-1,+1) 98 0.55% 0.69% 54/44 ) 1.855 0.0318 
(-30,+30) 98 5.20% 4.33% 55/43 > 2.585 0.0049 
Symbols ), > show direction and test of significance at 0.10 and 0.05 level. 
 
 
Table 3 presents results for the buy and hold strategy and in Table 4 we use the Scholes-Williams 
(Table 4) beta. 
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 TABLE 4 










Positive/Negative Patell Z p-value 
(+1,+30) 98 4.52% 3.88% 56/42 > 3.285 0.0005 
(-5,+5) 98 -0.19% 0.82% 51/47 1.141 0.1269 
(-1,+1) 98 0.56% 0.72% 55/43 > 1.928 0.0269 
(-30,+30) 98 5.88% 4.29% 55/43 > 2.553 0.0054 




RESULTS WITH MARKET MODEL FOR LONG PERIODS 
 
Days N Mean Compound Abnormal Return 
Precision 
Weighted CAAR Positive/Negative 
(-1, +250) 98 24.67% 17.03% 64/34 >>> 
(-30,+250) 98 25.98% 16.92% 65/33 >>> 
(0,+250) 98 24.53% 16.72% 66/32 >>> 
Symbol >>> shows direction and test of significance at 0.001 level 
 
 
Returns over long horizons are striking (Table 6). One could infer that the firms on the Focus list do 
change. Caution must be applied when examining these results. The reason is when we estimate (forecast) 
the market model the chances of errors are greater and thus the estimates are influenced by other 




SCHOLES WILLIAMS BETA 
 
Days N Mean Compound Abnormal Return 
Precision 
Weighted CAAR Positive/Negative 
(-1,+250) 98 24.86% 16.79% 63/35  >>> 
(-30,+250) 98 26.22% 16.71% 63/35 >>> 
(-1,+250) 98 24.71% 16.44% 63/35 >>> 
Symbol >>> shows direction and test of significance at 0.001 level 
Symbol  < shows direction and test of significance at 0.1 level 
 
 
We then look at a buy and hold strategy where the investors hold a focus portfolio from the day of 
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 TABLE 7 
RESULTS OF THE TWIN-EVENT WITH THE MARKET MODEL AND SCHOLES 
WILLIAMS MODEL. 
 
 Days Positive/Negative Patell Z p-value 
Market Model 1st date till 2nd 60/37 >> 4.561 < 0.0001 
Scholes Williams 1st date till 2nd 59/38 >> 4.391 < 0.0001 





CalPERS is known for its activist role. Focusing on the CalPERS focus list has merit. These firms 
that are on the list ‘react’ to the attention drawn. The initial drop in returns is expected since a large 
shareholder focuses attention on performance. In the longer term these firms improve performance. This 
improvement is difficult to attribute to being put on the focus list because other events confound the 
process. 
These results can be examined in an efficient markets framework and that has been done (see: for 
example: Junkin and Toth (2009); Barber (2007) and Crutchley et. al (1998)). We take a different 
approach: There is more attention being paid to the frailty of the mind and we explain these results in a 
Behavioral Finance framework. 
Some biology Coates (2012) explains such behavior. A winning streak builds confidence. The mind 
and body are affected. Testosterone and hemoglobin levels rise, muscles tense and a winning 
trader/investor is goaded into taking added risk. Investors who seek the focus list are similar in that they 
are aware that firms on this list will change. 
Daniel Kahneman (2011) describes the two systems of the brain: 
 
System 1 the mind operates automatically. 
System 2 the mind pays attention. 
 
We look at the behavioral finance literature to show the system 1 bias at work in similar situations to 
explain the phenomenon we document with the focus list.  
Barberis and Huang (2006) eloquently describe the plight of an average investor. Rational models of 
asset pricing do not reflect the dilemma of the investor who becomes aware of an investment under 
scrutiny. Take for example a firm showing up on the focus list. Does an investor hold on or, should they 
sell the shares, take the loss and move on? Our results permit the introduction of how individuals look at 
losses and how framing affects decision making. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) show that people pay 
more attention to losses than gains. Thaler (1980) addresses this issue as Mental Accounting. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) show how framing affects decision making. Framing is essentially how an issue is 
presented. The fact that a firm is being singled out for poor performance must affect a shareholder. 
Barber and Odean (2006) shed light on investor behavior by showing that attention grabbing stock 
experience abnormal trading volume and extreme one day returns. 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), show that investors normally underreact to earnings 
information and they overeact to news. Again, a firm in the news for poor performance creates some 
panic. However, Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) show that negative information spreads slowly and there is 
evidence of momentum in stock returns. While difficult to separate, one can surmise that the firm reacts 
and begins to improve with the attention. 
Cooper et. al. (2005) show investors reacting to ‘cosmetic’ announcements. A change in the name to 
reflect the current ‘hot’ investment style experiences an abnormal inflow of money into mutual funds. 
This is purely conjecture:  there is a chance that these events attract the less informed market participant 
while the firm chooses to change. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper confirms previous results of the behavior of stock returns of firms that show up on the 
CalPERs focus list. 
We describe in a behavioral framework the decision making of the investor. The market sees a list 
published by CalPERS focusing on the need to improve. This is an attention grabbing event. Investors 
choose to reduce investigating (search) time and cost and concentrate on trading. Over time the news is 
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